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Current studies of Chinese representation in the United Nations as-
sume that the Republic of China's expulsion was inevitable because of Chi-
ang Kai-shek's one China principle and Beijing's role in U.S. foreign pol-
icy. This paper provides another perspective on this event by mapping how
the United States, using a two Chinas strategy, endeavored to secure Ta-
ipei's seat and how Chiang Kai-shek faithfully executed this plan.
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There are two common explanations for the expulsion of the
Republic of China (hereafter ROC or Taiwan) from the United
Nations (UN). The first centers on the stubbornness of Chiang
Kai-shek (???), whose insistence that the ROC was the only legitimate
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government of China killed Taiwan's last chance to stay in the UN.1 The
other is that Taiwan lost its UN seat due to Washington's betrayal. The
Nixon administration's intimacy with Beijing compromised Washington's
ability to control this issue, and Taiwan therefore lost support.2 In other
words, Chiang's stubborn opposition to two Chinas plus Nixon's new
pro-Beijing policy contributed to Taipei's failure to retain its seat in the UN.
Given this convergence of circumstances, Taiwan's expulsion from the UN
was so inevitable that even if it had survived in 1971, "Taipei could have
remained in the UN for at most only one year."3
As Taipei and Washington declassified documents, scholars began
to develop new perspectives. The most popular revisionist view is that
Chiang Kai-shek was willing to accept the presence of two Chinas in the
UN.4 Thus, in 1971, Taipei seemed to be pursuing two opposing policies.
As demonstrated in part by Nixon personally corralling votes to protect
Taiwan's seat,5 Nixon and Kissinger were actively involved in this two
Chinas proposal and planned to keep Taiwan in the UN. As Robert
1See, for example, John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and
American Cold War Strategy in Asia (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 248-63. Blaming
Chiang for Taiwan's losing its chance to separate from China, most pro-Taiwan indepen-
dence scholars hold the same perspective; for example, Li Hsiao-feng, Taiwanren yinggai
renshi de Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek— what Taiwanese should know) (Taipei: Yushan-
she, 2004), 143-45. Adopting the same point of view, some mainland Chinese scholars
praise Chiang's insistence on a one China policy.
2See, for example, Nancy Tucker, Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the
United States, 1945-1992 (New York: Twayne, 1994), 104-5; James Mann, About Face: A
History of America's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1999), 38-39; Wang Jin-hung, Caifang lishi: cong huafu dang'an kan Taiwan
(Interviewing history: seeing Taiwan through Washington's archives) (Taipei: Yuanliu,
2000), 337-91.
3Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang, "Taiwan's Policy toward the U.S., 1969-1978," in Normalization
of U.S.-China Relations: An International History, ed. William Kirby, Robert Ross and
Gong Li (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 232.
4Many MA theses based on newly declassified documents have confirmed Chiang's attitude.
See Peng Tao, "The Policy toward the Issue of Chinese Representation in the UN of the
Nixon Administration" (MA thesis, Northeastern Normal University, Changchun, China,
2006); and Tsai Bingxiu, "Study of the Process of the ROC's Withdrawal from the United
Nations 1949-1971" (M.A. thesis, National Central University, Chungli, Taiwan, 2008).
5See Zhang Shaoduo, "Meiguo yu Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti" (America and
UN Chinese representation), Dangdai zhongguoshi yanjiu (Contemporary China History
Studies) 14, no. 6 (November 2007): 72-73.
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Accinelli indicates, Nixon and Kissinger remained committed to im-
proving relations with Beijing while keeping Taiwan in the UN.6 This
pledge manifested itself as promising one China to the People's Republic
of China (PRC) while lobbying for a two-seat agenda in the UN.
Therefore, interpreting the last battle over Chinese representation in
the UN is more complicated than it once seemed to be. Contemporary
conclusions concerning Taiwan's "pre-ordained" and "inevitable" expul-
sion may oversimplify the case.7 Hoping to provide another perspective
on the event, this paper will review the history of this development from
a different angle from that of the existing scholarship: that is, Chiang's
acceptance of two Chinas and the U.S. two Chinas proposal.
Before 1971
Understanding Chiang Kai-shek
The simplest thing that can be said about Chiang Kai-shek's attitude
toward the idea of two Chinas is that he always opposed it. His resistance
to the idea is understandable considering his nationalism, and it easily be-
comes the default lens through which to analyze his foreign policy. Yet,
his record of struggling against and compromising with warlords and the
Japanese makes it difficult to believe that he was not a realist who under-
stood the necessity of timely compromise.
Most analyses focus on Chiang's dedication to the one China ideal
and fail to notice his second choice. Zhang Chunying, for instance, praises
Chiang's opposition to Washington's two Chinas plan of the 1950s be-
cause Chiang, for fear of being suspected of splitting his government on
Taiwan from the Chinese mainland, resisted U.S. pressure to give up the
6Robert Accinelli, "In Pursuit of a Modus Vivendi," in Normalization of U.S.-China Relation,
37.
7For Taiwan's preordained and inevitable destiny, see, for example, Henry A. Kissinger,
White House Years (Boston Mass.: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 773; and Zhang,
"Meiguo yu Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti," 73-74.
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Kinmen (??) islands and also resisted surrendering Taiwan to UN
trusteeship.8
At the time when Zhang was making this argument, part of Chiang's
diary from the 1950s was made public, revealing him in this, his weakest
moment. Although UN trusteeship would have meant the de jure separ-
ation of Taiwan from Chinese territory, Chiang was willing to make this
sacrifice, hoping simply to retain "de facto governance."9 This diary entry
serves as an early instance of Chiang's potential willingness to accept a
division of sovereignty. He was willing to do this because to him, titles
were less important than state survival. Moreover, even though Kinmen
was one of his last links with the Chinese mainland, Chiang also repeatedly
considered withdrawing from the islands.10 In other words, a symbolic link
between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan might not have been as sacred
to him as was previously thought.
In the face of massive challenges, like most leaders, Chiang was
probably prepared to grin and bear unfavorable alternatives. Chiang's
adherence to one China served as camouflage for his deficient military
capability, and he used this facade to fight for the best outcome for the ROC
before he made any compromises— his strategy would safeguard his repu-
tation if ever negotiations turned sour. We should consider Chiang's attitude
toward Chinese representation in the UN via the comment of George Yeh,
the ROC's ambassador to the United States, 1958-1961: "Chiang looks
tough, but he will escape through the backdoor at the right moment."11
The 1961 U.S.-Taiwan Dispute over UN Strategy
During the 1950s, the United States adopted a moratorium strategy
to protect the ROC's seat in the UN: whenever a UN member proposed
8Zhang Chunying, "Shilun Jiang Jieshi wuci dizhi Meiguo fenli Taiwan de tumou" (On the
five times that Chiang Kai-shek blocked the U.S. conspiracy to separate Taiwan), Taiwan
yanjiu (Taiwan Studies) (Beijing), no. 2 (2000): 61-67.
9Qin Xiaoyi, ed., Zongtong Jianggong dashi changbian chugao (Chiang Kai-shek Chrono-
logy), vol. 9 (Taipei: Zhongzheng wenjiao jijinhui, 2003), 4335, 4356.
10Ibid., 4308-10.
11Shen Qi, Wode yisheng (My Life), vol. 4 (Taipei: Lianjing, 2000), 21.
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to expel the ROC by replacing it with the PRC, the United States would
propose a motion to table the issue until the following year. This strategy
was successful until 1960, when many of the UN's new members com-
plained of Washington's antics. In 1955, the ROC used its veto power
against Mongolia's admission to the UN because Mongolia was constitu-
tionally part of China. When Mongolia re-applied for UN membership in
1961, Moscow threatened to exercise its veto to block the entry of newly
independent African countries if the ROC blocked Mongolia again. Be-
cause the ROC needed these new African members to support its efforts
to retain its right to represent China, Taipei's one China principle and Wash-
ington's moratorium strategy both underwent revisions.
Washington devised two new methods to pacify the other member
states: a proposal to establish a UN research committee to suggest a reso-
lution to the Chinese representation issue or invoking the "important ques-
tion" clause. According to Article 18 (2) of the UN Charter, important
questions concerning matters such as the expulsion of members require a
two-third majority of the UN's full membership to pass. Taipei disliked
both of these methods because they opened the Chinese representation
question to public discussion.
Because Mongolia's admission to the UN implied the partition of
China, Taipei insisted on vetoing it regardless of the African votes Taipei
would lose as a consequence. In other words, Taipei acted as if it would
rather commit political suicide than violate its principle of representing a
united China, even though this gesture would hurt Washington's leadership
of the anti-communist world.
After serious disputes between Taipei and Washington, Taipei agreed
to tacitly accept Mongolia's admission and surrender its one China prin-
ciple. Moreover, the important question became the new strategy: China's
representation was an "important question" that could only be decided with
a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly.12
12Many scholars have analyzed the 1961 Washington-Taipei dispute based on the U.S. State
Department's Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1961-1963 Vol
XXII. See, for example, Tang Xiaosong, "1961 nian Mei Jiang guanyu wai Mengu
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By using the "important question" strategy, the U.S.-ROC alliance
could easily defeat the annual Albanian Resolution calling for the ROC to
be replaced by the PRC.13 If the issue was accepted as an "important ques-
tion," the Albanian Resolution would require a two-thirds majority, mean-
ing that most UN members would understand how difficult it would be to
expel Taipei that year. For fear of offending either Washington or Taipei,
both of whom were permanent members of the Security Council at the
time, UN members tended to favor the ROC when they voted on the Al-
banian Resolution. As Dean Rusk put it, "If the issue were decided to be
an important matter, there would probably not be a two-thirds majority for
any solution."14
The 1961 dispute was significant for three main reasons. First, it
took Chiang about seven months to soften his one China stance. Official
Washington-Taipei negotiations concerning the new strategy began around
March and ended just before the UN voting in October. President John F.
Kennedy had to personally convince Chiang to yield on the Mongolia issue
by promising some important concessions: the United States committed
itself to assisting Taiwan in building diplomatic relations in Africa, and
Kennedy pledged to use the Washington's veto power against Beijing when
necessary.
Second, due to right-wing pressure, Kennedy could not publicly
support Beijing's admission. Taiwan needed protection even though the
Kennedy administration obviously preferred a two Chinas solution. As
Lianheguo daibiaoquan wenti de zhenglun" (The dispute between the U.S.A. and Taiwan
on the deputy right of the Republic of Mongolia in the United Nations in 1961), Shixue
Yuekan (Journal of Historical Science) (Kaifeng), no. 1 (2003): 61-65; and Niu Dayun,
"Kennidi zhengfu yu 1961nian de Lianheguo daibiaoquan zhizheng" (the Kennedy admin-
istration and the 1961 UN Chinese representation dispute), Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu
(Journal of Chinese Communist Party History Studies) (Beijing), no. 4 (2000): 78-84; and
Zou Yao-yong, "1961 nian Mei Ying guanyu Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan de fenqi"
(The dispute on the Chinese Representation in UN between U.K. and U.S. in 1961), Jour-
nal of Shanghai University (Social Science Edition) 14, no. 2 (March 2007): 92-96.
13From the 1960s onwards, Albania proposed an annual motion in the General Assembly to
transfer the Chinese UN seat from the ROC to the PRC. For this reason, the motion is com-
monly referred to as the Albanian Resolution.
14See document #13, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXII/01to50.html (accessed August 25, 2010).
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Dean Rusk described it, "It is fundamental to the United States that For-
mosa retain a seat in the United Nations. If this is unacceptable to Peking
then they are at fault. We don't believe we should have to pay the ticket
for Peking's admission at Formosa's expense. If Peking won't accept ad-
mission under these conditions, then that is their choice and we would not
be responsible."15
Third, the question of Chinese representation attracted so much inter-
national attention because a small China occupied such a very important
position. Chinese legitimacy was a problem between Taipei and Beijing,
and it would have been less important to the rest of the world if neither had
held a permanent seat on the Security Council or if the importance of this
seat were diluted.
Fearing for its legitimacy as the government of China as well as its
status as a Security Council member, Taipei opposed the formation of a re-
search committee because it would almost guarantee a two Chinas out-
come. There was no way to control the composition of such a committee,
and worse, the committee might suggest that the General Assembly revisit
the Chinese position in the Charter, and "India, Japan, Brazil, and Nigeria,
all of whom wanted permanent membership of the Security Council, might
then take over the China seat."16
1961 was not the first time that China's right to occupy a Security
Council seat was put in question. As early as 1954, Secretary of State John
Dulles had thought to solve the problem of China's seat by replacing China
with India on the Security Council in a move to accommodate both Chinese
regimes in the General Assembly. Dulles approached an international
lawyer about changing the composition of the Security Council and even
discussed the issue with the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden.17 A
15See document #14. FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXII/01to50.html (accessed August 25, 2010).
16Telegram, ROC Delegation of the UN to ROC Embassy in the USA, 8/23/1961, in "Di
shiliu jie lianda daibiaoquan wenti" (Representation issue in the 16th Assembly), August
22-November 20, 1961, International Organization Department Files (hereafter IOF)
88086/633.02, ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter MOFA).
17Nancy B. Tucker, "John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the Two Chinas Policy," in
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similar scenario arose in 1961 when the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Adlai
Stevenson, mentioned to President Kennedy and the British prime minister,
Harold Macmillan, the alternative of "amend[ing] the United Nations
Charter."18 The Kennedy administration did seriously consider using Japan
and India to dilute the importance of the China seat.19
Taipei, though small, was the only permanent member of the Security
Council that represented people of color. It was therefore a concern that
other peoples of color would press for a change in representation. A UN
research committee on the Chinese seat would certainly see states such as
"India, Japan, Brazil, or Nigeria" logically requesting to replace China on
the Security Council. Taipei therefore considered that the "important ques-
tion" strategy was safer than that of establishing a research committee.
The 1966 U.S.-Taiwan Dispute over UN Strategy
In 1965, the "important question" proposal was passed (56:49), but
the Albanian Resolution for the first time resulted in a tie (47:47). The
United States sensed a general rise in dissatisfaction about postponing
the PRC's admission and was concerned that this tie would affect the 1966
ballot. To convince more UN members to support the "important ques-
tion," the United States again suggested instituting a research committee to
resolve the dilemma of Chinese representation. For the same reasons as
in 1961, Chiang was opposed to this plan. Because this proposal strongly
implied U.S. acceptance of two Chinas, Chiang once again threatened
to commit political suicide by withdrawing from the UN if the proposal
passed. Taipei and Washington were again in serious disagreement.20
John Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, ed. Richard Immerman (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 255.
18See document #18, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXII/01to50.html (accessed August 25, 2010).
19See Document #28, FRUS 1961-1963 Vol XXII, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/frusXXII/01to50.html, (accessed August 25, 2010).
20Many scholars have analyzed the 1966 Washington-Taipei dispute based on the U.S. State
Department's FRUS 1964-1968, Vol XXX. See, for example, Liu Zikui, "Meiguo yu 1966
nian Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti" (The US and China's Representation in the
UN in 1966), Contemporary China History Studies (Beijing) 14, no. 6 (November 2007):
55-61, Chen Changwei, "Yuehanxun zhengfu dui Lianheguo Zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti
The Republic of China's Last Battle in the UN
June 2011 95
The implications of this dispute were similar to those of 1961. The
first one was that it took Chiang about six months in 1966 to soften his in-
sistence on one China. This quarrel began around May and ended just be-
fore the UN voting in November. Like his predecessor, President Lyndon
B. Johnson had to personally coax Chiang, who again only yielded after
the United States made two concessions that echoed those made in 1961.
Johnson committed to extending U.S. sponsorship of Taiwan's aid to
Africa21 and to upholding Kennedy's promise to exercise the U.S. veto
power against Beijing. Consequently, Chiang modified his threat: if the
two Chinas proposal was passed, Taipei would effect a "temporary with-
drawal from the General Assembly only . . . not [a] withdraw[al] from the
Security Council."22
Another implication was that maintaining Taiwan's presence in the
UN was again at the heart of U.S. policy for two reasons. First, pressure
from the right wing meant that Taipei's withdrawal would have caused
serious international and domestic problems for Johnson, who was already
facing difficulties with his Vietnam policies. Second, as long as the ROC
stayed in the UN, Beijing would not join. As Dean Rusk explained to Tai-
pei, "a two-Chinas formula . . . is not . . . the view of the United States . . .
your presence in the UN, in effect, is the surest guarantee against a Com-
munist China presence."23
zhengce zhi yanjiu" (A Study of Lyndon Johnson's Policy toward Chinese Representation
in the United Nations), Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu (Journal of Chinese Communist Party
History Studies), (Beijing) no. 3 (2006): 31-41; Zhang Ying and Chi Haibo, "Yanjiu
weiyuanhui jueyi yu 60 niandai zhongqi Meiguo dui hua zhengce de tiaozheng"(The Regu-
lating of the Policy of the US to China and the Raising of Study Committee Resolution),
Dongbei shifan daxue xuebao (Journal of Northeast Normal University) (Changchun), no.
2 (2002): 18-24.
21Regarding the extension of Taiwan's assistance to Africa, see Philip Hsiaopong Liu, "Re-
assuring Friendship with Funds: Reviewing US-Taiwan Cooperation in Africa during the
1960s," Identity, Culture, and Politics: An Afro-Asian Dialogue 8, no. 1-2 (2007): 19-44.
22Deputy Foreign Minister Shen Qi reports to the Executive Yuan, 12/1/1966, in "Daibiao-
quanan yiban ziliao" (General Information of the Representation Issue), November 1971,
IOF 90043/640, MOFA. U.S. records use the terms "walk out" and "absent itself." See
Document # 218 and #219, FRUS 1964-68 Vol XXX, http://www.state.gov/www/about
_state/history/vol_xxx/210_219.html (accessed August 25, 2010).
23Document # 217, FRUS 1964-68 Vol XXX, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/
history/vol_xxx/210_219.html (accessed August 25, 2010).
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The issue of the Chinese seat in the Security Council had become an
annual annoyance to the U.S. government. Domestic politics required the
ROC to remain in the UN, but international politics opposed a small China
occupying such a critical position. Therefore, as it had done when it quar-
reled with the ROC in the past, the United States considered amending the
UN Charter to rotate the Security Council seat between India, Japan, and
China.24
Reviewing 1971
A New Voting Strategy
Before discussing the U.S.-Taiwan negotiation of 1971, I would like
to briefly describe the 1971 Washington-Taipei voting strategy. Essential-
ly, it was a combination of a new version of the "important question" and
"dual representation" approaches. The "important question" became the
"important question variable," and "dual representation" became "dual re-
presentation complex."
The difference between the "important question" and the "important
question variable" was that the new resolution applied only to Taiwan's
expulsion. Thus, a simple majority could lead to Beijing's admission, but
Taiwan's expulsion would need a two-thirds majority, which was still a big
challenge to supporters of the Albanian Resolution. Since the "important
question variable" was the key issue of the 1971 voting, to attract more sup-
porters, Washington needed a way to ensure the settlement of the China
issue.
Washington therefore introduced "dual representation" to demon-
strate to UN members that it sincerely intended to permanently resolve the
Chinese representation issue. "Dual representation" was in fact a clearer
version of the previous research committee proposal. In essence, it meant
24See Document # 202, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Canada,
FRUS 1964-68, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxx/200_209.html
(accessed August 25, 2010).
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one China with two representatives, and thus effectively produced two
Chinese governments in the UN. However, "dual representation" did not
mention which Chinese government should take over the Security Council
seat. Later, "dual representation complex" was born when extra articles
were appended to the original "dual representation" proposal specifying
that the Chinese seat on the Security Council should be assigned to the
PRC and implying the ROC's demotion from the Security Council to the
General Assembly.
The order of the resolutions on the voting agenda was "important
question variable," Albanian Resolution, and then "dual representation
complex." Ideally, "important question variable" would pass, thereby
nullifying the Albanian Resolution, and then the "dual representation com-
plex" vote would take place. Since the United States had gone to great
lengths to promote both "important question variable" and "dual represen-
tation complex," it hoped that countries that supported one of these pro-
posals would also support the other. Therefore, if "important question vari-
able" passed, there was a chance that "dual representation complex" could
pass also. However, if "important question variable" failed, most members
would understand that the Albanian Resolution would pass, and then "dual
representation complex" would not even be put to the vote.25
25John Garver opines that the United States did not try hard enough to dominate the General
Committee, the congregation that sets the agenda for the General Assembly's deliberations.
The U.S. ambassador to the UN George Bush had proposed combining the Albanian Reso-
lution and the U.S, "dual representation" resolution into a single "question of China" item
to be considered together by the General Assembly, because leaving the two separate could
mean that the Assembly's debate and actions on the first proposal might prejudice or pre-
empt consideration of the second item. This eventually became the case. Bush's proposal
was defeated 12:9 with 3 abstentions. Garver argues that the United States should have
been able to win over three or four votes because among those abstaining were Belgium
and Ireland, whose delegates had earlier spoken in favor of the U.S. proposal, and among
those voting against the proposal was Britain. Garver further contends that this agenda-
setting failure had a decisive influence on the U.S. proposal. He quotes Kissinger, "U.S. of-
ficials believed that they could win one more vote in the Important Question (Variable)
which would have forced a debate and a vote on the U.S. dual representation solutions,"





In broad terms, Richard Nixon's friendliness toward Beijing in 1969
and Henry Kissinger's 1971 Beijing visits contributed to Taipei's demise in
the UN. Scholars have meticulously outlined why Nixon turned to the PRC
and how Kissinger confessed to Beijing that Taiwan was part of China. I
will not discuss the White House's new policy toward Beijing, but would
like to emphasize that even though Nixon and Kissinger seduced the PRC
by claiming that Taiwan was part of China, they still attempted to secure
Taiwan's place in the UN.
When Nixon assumed office, the Cultural Revolution was drawing to
a close in the PRC but the Sino-Soviet conflict and the U.S. involvement in
Vietnam were just beginning and hightening. Rapprochement with the
PRC was a rational move for the United States, but Nixon could not forsake
Chiang because of the threat of domestic challenges. Although Nixon's
right-wing political history could ward off accusations of appeasement,
selling out an ally might have cost him his main support base. As Tucker
indicates, Taiwan's debacle in the UN did in fact anger the right wing and
cost Nixon his second term.26
Nixon was particularly anxious about the response of Governor
Ronald Reagan of California. Reagan's reputation would secure California
for Nixon and calm pro-Taiwan rightists (Kissinger even told Zhou Enlai
(???) that if their discussion about Reagan's function became public,
Zhou would have to find him a job). Having the UN expel Taiwan might
have turned people like Reagan against him. As Kissinger told Zhou, be-
cause 62 percent of Americans opposed the expulsion of Taiwan, passing
the Albanian Resolution would rally Nixon's opponents.27 He later con-
firmed his message to Nixon, "It was better for both of our countries [the
United States and the PRC] if the Albanian Resolution did not pass this
year [1971], for then the process [of normalization] would be too fast and
26Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "Taiwan Expendable? Nixon and Kissinger Go to China," Jour-
nal of American History 92, no. 1 (June 2005): 109-35.
27Doc #162, p 506, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
70143.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
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there would be a rallying point for opponents of your China policy."28 So,
in 1971, as in the 1960s, at least because of right-wing pressure, the White
House needed to keep Taiwan in the UN.
In essence, although Taipei first hoped to continue with the old "im-
portant question" strategy and later requested to keep its Security Council
seat, Nixon did not let Taipei commit suicide. To keep the ROC in the UN,
Washington patiently worked to convince Taipei to accept new strategies
("important question variable," "dual representation," and "dual represen-
tation complex") to attract more votes. When the situation was unfavorable
to Taiwan, Nixon and Kissinger mandated the State Department to win
votes and personally fought for Taiwan behind closed doors.29 If Nixon
had not wanted to keep Taiwan in the UN, he need not have invested this
effort; he could have yielded to Taiwan's outdated strategy and waited for
Taiwan's expulsion.
Nixon was not alone in adopting this two-pronged approach to Chi-
nese representation in the UN. He followed the tactics of previous ad-
ministrations by opening the door more widely for the PRC while working
to keep Taiwan in the UN. The difference between Nixon and his two pre-
decessors was that Nixon could earn political credit both by helping Taiwan
and by approaching Beijing. It was logical for him to pursue the two goals
at the same time: ideally, he would achieve both, but by only accomplishing
one or the other, he would still have gained.
A Sustainable Plan
To accomplish both of these goals simultaneously, the White House
was trying to realize a form of two Chinas in the UN, which was why Zhou
Enlai criticized Kissinger for America's "one China, two Governments"
28Doc #164, p 537, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
70143.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
29Doc #425, p 844, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
49149.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010); and Zhang, "Meiguo yu Lianheguo Zhongguo
daibiaoquan wenti," 72-73. Zhang argues that Nixon was only feigning his support.
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plan.30 The logic was as follows:31
We saw no legal obstacle to the General Assembly deciding that, for the present
at least, China shall be represented by a delegation from PRC and a delegation
from ROC. . . . The Charter nowhere defines either "state" or "member" and
[the] two terms cannot be considered synonymous. India, for example, became
a member of the UN when still a part of the British Empire and before it had
attributes of sovereignty which would permit it to be described as "state" in in-
ternational law. Other original members of the UN (e.g., the Philippines, Syria,
Lebanon) were in a similar situation. The best examples of members which
were not states remain Ukraine and Byelorussia.
From the very beginning, even Kissinger agreed to have "a strate-
gy . . . for preventing Taipei's expulsion, not just for a year or so, but for the
foreseeable future."32 To let Taiwan stay for the foreseeable future, Beijing
must be admitted also, so, in Kissinger's words, "if we opt for Peking's
membership in the UN, it brings us very close to an unspoken two China
policy."33
But how unspoken was this strategy in actuality? Even though Nixon
and Kissinger were trying to seduce Beijing with a one China strategy, they
were actually practicing two Chinas in the UN. Kissinger tried to convince
Zhou Enlai that "this is temporarily one China, one Taiwan,"34 and that "[if
the U.S. resolution passed] it will make it easier next year to moderate our
policies in the UN."35 Kissinger's goal was to convince Zhou to accept
two Chinas in 1971, but he did not elaborate on policies for the following
year. This was how Kissinger explained the "important question variable"
30Doc #162, p 499, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
70143.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
31Doc #393, p 775, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
49149.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
32Doc #344, p 658, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
33Doc #341, p 644, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
34Doc #143, p 448, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
70142.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
35Doc #162, p 506, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
70143.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
The Republic of China's Last Battle in the UN
June 2011 101
to Zhou Enlai: "You would be able to take the Security Council's seat to
China, and as soon as you can get the two-thirds vote for expulsion, you
would be the only representative of China in the UN."36 He talked only
about the "important question variable," but did not emphasize that the
"important question variable" "would have the effect that dual representa-
tion would win," which is what he told Nixon.37
Scholars and documents focus mostly on negotiations that occurred
before Taiwan was expelled, but rarely discuss what the United States was
prepared to do if Taiwan had stayed. It was generally accepted that even if
"dual representation complex" had passed, Beijing would not have joined
unless Taiwan left the UN. This is based on the assumption that China
was very important and that the whole world hoped to see Beijing instead
of Taipei in the UN.
However, Taipei's problem was that it purported to represent main-
land China and occupied a permanent seat on the Security Council. It
followed logically then that Beijing could ask to resume its legal right in
the UN and expel Taipei. Had Taipei acted as Taiwan, where it enjoyed
effective rule, and had Taipei stayed in the General Assembly like most
other states, UN members would likely have been more reluctant to expel
it. Beijing surely would force Taipei to leave, but Kissinger was hoping
to "hold together a coalition of those who like Taipei, those who dislike
Peking, and those who are beholden to us, sufficient to resist such a demand
from Peking."38
The White House's 1971 plan was essentially a remnant of U.S.
strategies of the 1960s: "[our strategy] would stand a good chance of
commanding majority support and thus blocking passage of the Albanian
Resolution. Moreover, if Peking refused to enter on this basis, the onus for
36Doc #140, p 413, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
70142.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
37Doc #342, p 645, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
38Doc #341, p 640, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
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its non-participation would be squarely on Peking."39 The only major re-
vision was that Beijing would get the Security Council seat and the United
States would publicly support it. If Beijing still refused to join the UN
in order to force Taiwan to leave, it would not be surprising if an annoyed
U.S. government re-used another 1960s strategy:40
Passage of a dual representation resolution by the Assembly is unlikely to result
in Peking taking the seat in the immediate future, but could lead to a situation
in which the ROC representative is expelled from the Council (in order to make
possible the offer of the seat to Peking) and the seat remains temporarily vacant.
PRC membership on the Council is likely to increase pressures for Charter re-
vision (something which we have generally opposed and to which, according
to intelligence reports, Peking is also opposed) to enlarge the Council by the
addition of new permanent members (e.g. Japan and/or India, and perhaps the
FRG after it becomes a member of the UN), to do away with the permanent
member veto, or to add new permanent members without the right of veto. If
Charter revision continues to appear inadvisable or unobtainable, one possible
but unlikely solution might be agreement in the respective regional caucuses to
give states such as Japan, India or Brazil semi-permanent member status
through repeated elections to the Council.
Finally, should the seat remain empty for any substantial period of time, this
might lead to pressures to reassign it to another Asian power (again Japan and
India would be the logical contenders), a factor which Peking would also have
to take into account.
In other words, the American strategy entailed forming a two Chinas
framework in the UN and forcing the PRC to accept it by threatening to
deprive China of its position on the Security Council. If Taipei had been
moved to the General Assembly but Beijing had still refused to join the
Security Council, it was possible that the United States would have pro-
posed promoting Japan or India to the Security Council in an attempt to
provoke Beijing to join. It would be almost unthinkable for Beijing to
accept Japan, China's long-standing enemy, becoming a world power by
Beijing's absence. As for India, although there had been a military conflict
39Doc #341, p 639, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
40Doc #352, p 680, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
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with the PRC in the early 1960s, India had always supported the PRC as
the legitimate representative of China in the UN because of its leadership
of the non-aligned movement. Its effort to expel Taiwan from the General
Assembly would be in doubt if India was a replacement candidate for
China on the Security Council.
Chiang Kai-shek's Two-Pronged Diplomacy
Between late-1970 and late-March 1971, Beijing gained eight allies:
Canada, Equatorial Guinea, Italy, Ethiopia, Chile, Nigeria, Kuwait, and
Cameroon. Of the eight, five had switched recognition from Taipei. This
was a direct result of the unfavorable vote on Chinese representation in
1970, when the Albanian Resolution was passed by two votes (51:49).
Luckily for the ROC, the "important question" passed 66:52 before the
Albanian Resolution was put to the vote, and thus a two-thirds majority
was necessary to change the representation of China.
Nixon commented that "the old man [President Chiang Kai-shek] is
partly a realistic figure."41 Chiang Kai-shek may have been stubborn, but
he was not dumb. He was aware that many changes had taken place in the
world and the ROC consequently needed to adjust its China policy. He
had considered putting Taiwan under UN trusteeship and withdrawing his
army from Kinmen in 1950 when the world was against him, and he was
prepared to ditch the one China principle in both 1961 and 1966 when the
prospects for the UN looked unfavorable. It is therefore not surprising that
he adjusted his position on Chinese legitimacy in 1971. His challenge was
to make this adjustment look good.
Chiang, like the US presidents he dealt with, had to face domestic dis-
sent on policy changes. If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for instance,
gave the slightest attention to Japanese or American opinions on UN policy
that differed from those of the ROC, senior legislators or influential party
leaders were quick to attack the government for being in favor of two
41Doc #342, p 654, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
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Chinas.42 Both the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly proposed
imaginative ways to secure the ROC's world status. Some wanted to launch
a "Charter Protection Movement" in the UN to guarantee the ROC's seat on
the Security Council because the UN Charter still recognized the ROC as a
permanent member of the Security Council, while others proposed using
Chinese morals and culture to influence the views of other countries.43 A
former foreign minister and senior party leader, Huang Shaogu (???),
suggested that the ROC propose to abolish the Security Council's veto
power in an effort to win the friendship of smaller countries and thus im-
prove the ROC's popularity.44 Obviously, more than twenty years into
the Cold War, many of the political elite in Taiwan still had no realistic
awareness of the state of world affairs and therefore stood firmly by their
one China principle.
In these circumstances, Chiang's best strategy was to feign a one
China stance while quietly acquiescing in Washington's two Chinas pro-
posal. If the UN vote was favorable, Chiang would be celebrated for secur-
ing the ROC's position in the UN, and if the PRC refused to join, Taipei
would remain the sole representative of China in the UN. If the vote was
unfavorable, domestic politicians would still respect Chiang for upholding
the ROC's historic nationalist mission and the one China principle.
Taipei's Prompt Response to Dual Representation
As usual, official discussions between Washington and Taipei on UN
strategy began around February 1971. The United States formally advised
Taipei that the best way to win over the 1971 General Assembly was to
42Reference Note, Executive Yuan to MOFA, 3/9/1971, in "Lianheguo wodaibiaoquan?
yibanxin shiwu" (Chinese Representation in the UN?General Affairs), from December
19, 1970 to June 29, 1971, IOF: 90019/640, MOFA.
43See in Letter, Liu Dongyen from National Assembly to MOFA, ibid, and Dahua Wanbao
(Dahua Evening News), 8/6/1971, in "Zhongguo waijiao zhengce yu duiwaiguanxi" (Chi-
nese Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations), from February 1, 1967 to November 30, 1971,
Department of North American Affairs Files, 411.1/0043, MOFA.
44Letter, the Nationalist Party to MOFA, 9/15/1971, in "Lianda di ershiliujie wodaibiaoquan
zaxian" (Collected Information on Chinese Representation in the 26th UN General As-
sembly) from July 29, 1971 to October 13, 1971, IOF: 90088/640, MOFA.
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put forward a proposal that featured one China with two different seats.
According to Taipei's records, U.S. officials pointed out that in this way,
Beijing "would not enter for at least another three to five years."45 Secre-
tary of State William Rogers even predicted to Nixon that Taiwan might
have up to four years with this plan.46
Since Taipei and Beijing would have separate seats under this propo-
sal, any motions to expel the ROC would require the Security Council's
consent— an impossibility, because the United States would exercise its
veto— as well as a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly. The ROC
wanted to use the "important question" strategy again to defeat the Al-
banian Resolution, and replied that coexistence with Communist China
was unacceptable because it was against Taipei's fundamental interests.
However, on March 15, without any pressure or concessions from
Washington, Chiang Kai-shek informed the ROC's ambassador to the
United States that he, in essence, accepted Washington's "new proposal,"
but would not allow this strategy to affect the ROC's position on the Secur-
ity Council.47 In mid-April, Nixon sent his special envoy, Robert Murphy,
to Taiwan to officially accept Chiang's request. The United States would
safeguard the ROC's seat on the Security Council while the dual represen-
tation proposal was introduced in the UN.
The United States did not communicate any further details on the UN
voting strategy after Murphy's departure, so Taipei essentially relied on
Murphy to convey its message and awaited the oncoming battle. However,
after Kissinger visited Beijing, the situation seemed very unpromising. On
July 23, Taipei asked the U.S. government to keep its promise and adopt
effective measures to secure the ROC's seat on the Security Council.
45See above information in "Lianda daibiaoquan yinying jinguo jiyao" (Summary of Deal-
ings with UN Chinese Representation), from October 7, 1971 to October 18, 1971, IOF
640/90038, MOFA. The U.S. officials were Jenkins, Shoesmith, and Feldman from the
State Department.
46Doc #342, p 654, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
47See in "Lianda daibiaoquan yinying jinguo jiyao" (Summary of Dealings with UN Chinese
Representation), from October 7, 1971 to October 18, 1971, IOF 640/90038, MOFA.
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Secretary Rogers said that Washington wanted to comply, but after con-
sulting with other countries, it could only guarantee the ROC's UN seat
by admitting Beijing's right to the China seat in the dual representation
proposal.48
Although Washington's response contradicted Murphy's promise,
Taipei's response was cool. On July 25, the ROC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs formally informed the U.S. government that the ROC itself would
have to speak against the dual representation proposal, and requested the
United States not to comment on which party should take the Security
Council seat. Taipei further requested that the United States oppose any
motions to amend the proposal and give the seat to Beijing.49 Meanwhile,
Chiang adjusted his definition of "being opposed to two Chinas": he in-
structed his ambassador to speak, but not necessarily vote, against "dual
representation."50 Taipei already knew that it would lose its Security Coun-
cil seat, and simply asked the United States not to publicly agree with or
facilitate this result.
On August 2, Secretary Rogers formally revealed Washington's pro-
posal to the world. The United States would support the PRC's admission
to the UN, but would oppose the expulsion of the ROC. Honoring Taipei's
request, Rogers did not acknowledge Beijing's right to a seat on the Secur-
ity Council, but remarked only that the seating problem would be a decision
for all UN members.
Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang suggests that because Taipei was reluctant to
agree to Beijing's admission, friendly states were unaware of the ROC's at-
titude toward "dual representation" and this was a key reason why Taiwan
was defeated in the UN.51 This argument is problematic, however, because
Taipei's allies would have known its real intention. On August 19, the ROC
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
50Chien Fu, Chien Fu huiyilu (The Memoirs of Chien Fu), vol. I (Taipei: Tianxia, 2005), 151.
Chien was director of North American affairs in the ROC Foreign Ministry from 1969 to
1972 as well as being ROC foreign minister from 1990 to 1996.
51Chang, "Taiwan's Policy," 231-32.
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Foreign Ministry directed its ambassadors to inform host countries that the
ROC opposed giving the Security Council seat to Beijing, but at the same
time, foreign posts were instructed to "verbally" request that host countries
support "dual representation" and "disregard [the ROC's official] attitude."52
There is written proof of these directions. For example, on August
24, Malawi received a "strictly confidential" memorandum from the
Embassy of the ROC:53
For the purpose of providing an alternative to the so-called Albanian draft reso-
lution which prescribes the expulsion of the Republic of China as a sine qua non
to the seating of the Chinese Communist regime in the United Nations, and with
a view to defeating such a resolution, a proposal known as "Dual Representa-
tion" has been advanced by Governments friendly to the Republic of China, in
collaboration with those Governments which maintain a fair and just a ttitude
toward the matter. Although the Republic of China, for obvious reasons, cannot
itself subscribe to this formula, the endorsement given to said proposal by the
Government of the Republic of Malawi will ensure its adoption. Furthermore,
any attempt to prevent the adoption of "Dual Representation" proposal . . . must
be effectively opposed and rejected.
On September 8, the United States told Taiwan that, because its pro-
posal had failed to receive sufficient endorsement, it was now necessary to
add an additional article assigning the Security Council seat to Beijing. In
other words, the United States would replace "dual representation" with
"dual representation complex," which stated clearly that Beijing should
take over the Security Council seat.
It is likely that the ROC was humiliated because Washington's pref-
erence for Beijing demonstrated its new allegiance. But, again, Taipei's
response was measured. On September 11, the ROC Foreign Ministry sent
telegrams to all its overseas missions informing them that it was inappro-
priate for the ROC to request host countries to support the U.S. proposal,
and that, for the moment, host countries should look to the United States
and the ROC's other allies for indications as to whether to vote in favor of
52See note 47 above.
53Memorandum, ROC Embassy to Malawi Ministry of External Affairs, August 24, 1971,




"dual representation complex." If host countries asked about the ROC's
position on the matter, diplomatic missions should simply say that they
were waiting for Taipei's response.
Kissinger prophesied that "Chiang Kai-shek would find it intolerable
if the United States openly supported or acquiesced in depriving Taipei of
its Security Council seat. Taipei might very well prefer to walk out of
the UN rather than accept such a development."54 However, that did not
happen. Taipei's quandary took only about ten days to resolve internally.
When the United States officially submitted "dual representation complex"
to the UN on September 22, Taipei simultaneously released news of an of-
ficial policy change: ambassadors were to tell host countries that the ROC
would understand their endorsement of "dual representation complex" if
they felt that it was truly in the ROC's best interests.55
On September 27, the Foreign Ministry re-published this order with
detailed instructions. The revised version informed all missions that even
though "dual representation complex" violated the ROC's position, because
its purpose was to secure the ROC's place in the UN, Taipei would fully
understand if its allies supported the proposal. To prevent misunder-
standings, the Foreign Ministry attached to this memorandum a message
in English that diplomats were forbidden to allow host countries to see in
written form. The ROC's diplomats were again to "verbally" convey the
following message:56
If the government of [the host country] in its own judgment co-sponsors and/or
supports [the contents of the Dual Representation Complex], it would have the
full understanding of the government of the ROC.
For the moment, the ROC could relax. Using "dual representation
complex" to help pass "important question variable" worked. On October
2, Taipei estimated that the result of the "important question variable" vote
54Doc #341, p 642, FRUS 1969-76 Vol V, http://www.state .gov/documents/organization/
49148.pdf (accessed August 25, 2010).
55See note 47 above.
56Telegram, Foreign Minister Zhou to all Diplomatic Posts Abroad, 9/27/1971, in "Ershiliujie
lianheguo daibiaoquan wenti" (Chinese Representation in the 26th UN General Assembly),
from September 15, 1971 to October 27, 1971, IOF: 90031/640, MOFA.
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would be sixty-three votes for, sixty-one against, three abstentions, and
four unknown (but about which the ROC was optimistic).57 The U.S. mis-
sion to the UN shared Taipei's optimism.58 Three days later, however, the
White House announced that Kissinger would soon be making another
visit to Beijing. Taipei re-estimated the results of the "important question
variable" vote on October 8, notably with more pessimism: sixty votes
for, sixty-three against, and six abstentions. Although the U.S. delegation
struggled hard on Taipei's behalf, Kissinger's visit inflicted damage. Kis-
singer was leaving for Beijing around October 20, and at that time, the
United States released its most optimistic estimate of the "important ques-
tion variable" result: fifty-eight for, fifty-seven against, and fifteen ab-
stentions, while Taiwan anticipated a vote of 58:60:12. On October 22, the
ROC ambassador to the United States informed Taipei that "the situation
is at a stalemate; all estimations of votes are extremely close."59 Two days
later, a phone call from Nixon pushed Argentina into the "maybe for" cate-
gory, and the last projection of the "important question variable" result
was 58:58.60
The situation was so tense that nobody could reliably predict the vote.
At 16:00 Taipei time (04:00 New York time) on October 25, 1971, Chiang
made the following speech in the National Security Conference:61
Our permanent seat in the UN Security Council has become a token seat. In
fact, for a very long time, other powers have derecognized our position as a
permanent member of the Security Council. Whenever critical questions arose,
they did not listen to us, and decisions were always made by a couple of big
powers. It is a humiliation for us to sit as a permanent member of the Security
Council. This is a national disgrace. Therefore, I am considering withdrawing
from the UN when the appropriate time comes. . . . If we must lose our battle
57Chien, Chien Fu huiyilu, 155.
58Accinelli, "In Persuit of a Modus Vivendi," 37.
59Telegram, James T.H. Shen from Washington DC to Taipei, 10/22/1971, in "Ershiliujie
lianda daibiaoquanan meiguo lichang" (American Position on Chinese Representation in
the 26th UN General Assembly) from August 5, 1971 to October 16, 1971, IOF: 90003/
640.635, MOFA.
60Chien, Chien Fu huiyilu, 155-58.
61Conference Note, 30th National Security Conference, 10/25/1971, in "Lianda zhongguo
daibiaoquan wenti zajuan" (Collected File of UN Chinese Representation), from Aug 29,
1970 to Aug 29, 1971, IOF: 90081/640, MOFA.
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in the UN, we should make it an honorable exit rather than a shameful one.
Maintaining the dignity and honor of our country is far more important
than keeping a seat in the UN. . . . Since there is no justice and law in the UN
today, it has become a filthy place, so why does it deserve our attachment? . . .
Both the resolutions on UN Chinese representation, that is, the Albanian and
American (dual representation complex) proposals, violate the UN Charter.
The only difference between them is the degree to which they deprive us of our
rights. . . . Thus, before the voting on the Albanian proposal takes place, we
should withdraw from the UN. Even when voting on the American proposal,
we should vote against or absent ourselves from the balloting. Now I am
making this decision in the position of the (Chinese) revolutionary leader. We
will keep the honor of our country rather than a shameful seat.
More importantly, Chiang's speech was followed by supplementary written
instructions on his UN strategy:
1. If the "important question variable" cannot be discussed first, or if it fails
to pass, we will announce our withdrawal before the Albanian Resolution vote
occurs. We can wait a little to see if a revision of this proposal is in progress.
If not, the Albanian Resolution will surely pass, and we must withdraw before
it is put to the vote.
2. If the "important question variable" passes and the Albanian Resolution fails,
when the U.S. "dual representation complex" is put to the vote , we should speak
against it because it violates Article 23 of the UN Charter. Even though this
proposal supports our membership in the UN, its contents recommend that the
Communists take our seat on the Security Council. We will protest "dual re-
presentation complex," boycott the vote on it, and make appropriate announce-
ments after the proposal passes. We will also see if the Communists are coming
and make further just and honorable statements. If the U.S. proposal is revised
and dissected by disapproving countries, we should vote for the articles that
support our membership, but vote against the rest.
Chiang's last instructions are revealing evidence of the ROC's UN
strategy. On the one hand, the ROC opposed any measures that violated its
legitimacy as the government of China, but on the other hand, it had tacitly
agreed to two Chinas. The public heard Chiang's impressive instruction to
"vote against" "dual representation complex," but his real intention was
contained in the following words: "or absent ourselves from the balloting."
Prior to that day, Taipei had informed the United States that it would ab-
stain,62 the same method of acceptance as it had adopted in 1966. The
62Chang, "Taiwan's Policy toward the U.S.," 231.
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written instruction was even more flexible— Chiang ordered his UN repre-
sentatives to "speak against," "protest", or "boycott," but said nothing
about voting against.
Given these statements, even if "dual representation complex" had
passed, Taipei would likely have left the conference room temporarily to
save face. Considering Taipei's tacit acceptance of two Chinas, however,
Chiang's mention of the "just and honorable statement" and the making
of "appropriate statements" would likely have meant quietly accepting
reality.
Compared to previous negotiations on strategy changes, there ap-
pear to have been fewer disputes between Taipei and Washington in 1971.
Without any pressure from the U.S. president and even though Washington
had broken its promise, Taipei's response to Washington's two Chinas pro-
posal was prompt, calm, and cooperative. It accepted the dual representa-
tion concept as soon as the bilateral talk began, and tacitly accepted the
fact that Beijing would obtain the Security Council seat once the United
States had adopted the "dual representation complex" strategy. The ROC
was obviously willing to pay any price for its seat in the UN, even if it
was only in the General Assembly. Its one China statements were only a
mask for its new position.
Conclusion
"The remarkable thing about the effort to preserve a place for the
Republic of China in the 26th General Assembly was not that it
failed, but that it failed so narrowly." ? US State Department63
The results of the 1971 vote are well known. The U.S. "important
question variable" proposal was defeated by four votes (59:55, with 17 ab-
stentions or absentees). The Albanian Resolution was then passed by a
63Doc#455, p. 917, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969-76 Vol V, http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/49149.pdf , (accessed August 25, 2010).
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wide margin. The vote in favor of the Albanian Resolution meant that dual
representation never had a chance to be tested.
History claims that due to the rise of the PRC, Taiwan's failure was
pre-ordained. Nixon's pro-Beijing policy and Chiang's one China doctrine
became the scapegoats for Taipei's exclusion from the UN. But the fact
was that Beijing was ready to lose the 1971 UN vote given Washington's
endeavors to secure Taiwan's seat.64 Although historical discussions
should not be based on events that never transpired, it is equally wrong to
fixate entirely on what did occur without investigating the preparations that
had been made for a different outcome. If the results of the votes had been
slightly different, history might have chosen to praise Chiang's two Chinas
diplomacy and Nixon's efforts to secure the ROC's place in the UN.
Scholars and politicians have rarely noted Taipei's compliance with
Washington's two Chinas proposal or its endeavors to convince its allies
to accept this policy. As in the 1960s, there was still strong right-wing pres-
sure on the White House to support Taiwan, and the United States still
planned to force Beijing's entry into the UN by diluting the importance
of China's seat. The major difference was that Chiang Kai-shek's response
to the United States was prompt and cooperative.
Seeing the entirety of the negotiations and efforts between Wash-
ington and Taipei, we can logically assume that, had Taipei not lost the
"important question variable" vote in 1971, the ROC's allies, including the
United States, would have pushed it toward a clearer two Chinas frame-
work in order to guard against the Albanian Resolution in subsequent
years. Accordingly, Chiang (and his son) would have had to endure the
pressure of redefining Taipei's one China policy on an annual basis until it
satisfied UN members. Taiwan's destiny was not so pre-ordained.
Unfortunately, the PRC replaced the ROC on the Security Council
and obtained veto power, so Taiwan was never able to rejoin the UN. Thus,
without the annual problem of securing its UN seat, the Chiangs and their
fellow Nationalists won a reprieve from external pressure and were able
64Tsai, "Zhonghua minguo tuichu Lianheguo," 239-42.
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to keep themselves hidden away in their fortress of Chinese legitimacy. Al-
though a popular explanation for Taiwan's loss of its UN seat was Chiang's
insistence on a rigid one China policy, in actuality the causality is reversed:
Chiang's one China policy appeared rigid because Taiwan lost its seat.
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organization/70143.pdf.
Doc #162, p 499, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/70143.pdf.
Doc #164, p 537, FRUS 1969-76, Vol XVII http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/70143.pdf.
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II. ROC Foreign Ministry Files (MOFA)
1. Department of International Organization Files, Republic of China
(IOF, MOFA)
IOF: 88086/633.02, MOFA. Telegram, ROC Delegation of the UN to ROC Em-
bassy in the USA, 8/23/1961, in"Di shiliu jie lienda daibiaoquan wenti" (Re-
presentation Issue in the 16th Assembly), August 22, 1961 to November 20,
1961.
IOF: 90019/640, MOFA. Reference Note, Executive Yuan to MOFA, 3/9/1971, in
"Lianheguo wodaibiaoquan— Yibanxin shiwu" (Chinese Representation in
the UN?General Affairs), from December 19, 1970 to June 29, 1971.
IOF: 90031/640, MOFA . Telegram, Foreign Minister Zhou to all Diplomatic
Posts Abroad, 9/27/1971, in "Ershiliujie lianheguo daibiaoquan wenti"
(Chinese Representation in the 26th UN General Assembly), from Septem-
ber 15, 1971 to October 27, 1971.
IOF: 90038/640, MOFA. "Lianda daibiaoquan yinying jinguo jiyao" (Summary
of Dealings with UN Chinese Representation), from October 7, 1971 to Oc-
tober 18, 1971.
IOF: 90043/640, MOFA, Report, Deputy Foreign Minister Shen Qi to the Execu-
tive Yuan, 12/1/1966, in "Daibiaoquanan yiban ziliao" (General Information
on the Representation Issue), November 1971.
IOF: 90081/640, MOFA. Conference Note, 30th National Security Conference,
10/25/1971, in "Lianda zhongguo daibiaoquan wenti zajuan" (Collected
File of UN Chinese Representation), from August 29, 1970 to August 29,
1971.
IOF: 90088/640, MOFA. Letter, the Nationalist Party to MOFA, 9/15/1971, in
"Lianda di ershiliujie wodaibiaoquan zaxian" (Collected Information on
Chinese Representation in the 26th UN General Assembly) from July 29,
1971 to October 13, 1971.
IOF: 90003/640.635, MOFA. Telegram, James T. H. Shen from Washington DC
to Taipei, 10/22/1971, in "Ershiliujie lianda daibiaoquanan meiguo lichang"
(American Position on Chinese Representation in the 26th UN General As-
sembly) from August 5, 1971 to October 16, 1971.
2. Department of North American Affairs Files, Republic of China
Department of North American Affairs Files: 411.1/0043, MOFA Dahua Wanbao
(Dahua Evening News), 8/6/1971, in "Zhongguo waijiao zhengce yu du-
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iwaiguanxi" (Chinese Foreign Policy and Foreign Relations), from February
1, 1967 to November 30, 1971.
III. National Archives of Malawi
National Archives of Malawi: 10-1-7R/37506/EA12116, Memorandum, ROC Em-
bassy to Malawi Ministry of External Affairs, August 24, 1971, in "Admis-
sion of Communist China to the UN."
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